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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to provide an update to
the research team’s 2016 report “Electricity Customer
Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed
Traditional Monopoly Regulation” using data for 2016
through 2018.
KEY FINDINGS:
1.	Since 2011, Ohio consumers have saved
$23.9 billion because of deregulation. Of
this total savings, $19.5 billion resulted from
competitive auctions driving down the price of the
utilities’ Price to Compare (PTC). These savings
are realized by Ohio electric consumers who
obtain their power from the default generation
service that sets the price for this utility service.
An additional $4.4 billion has been saved by
consumers who contracted with Competitive
Retail Electric Service (CRES) providers or
governmental aggregators and were able to
negotiate electricity prices below the PTC.
	The 2016 report analyzed data through 2015 and
estimated that Ohio consumers had saved about
$3 billion per year, $15 billion in total, through
deregulation between 2011 and 2015. That
report set forth two types of savings:

•	“Shopping” are those costs avoided through
purchasing electricity from a CRES provider,
rather than defaulting into the Standard
Service Offer (SSO) (used to create the PTC).
•	“SSO Auction” are the savings resulting
from utilities setting their SSOs through a
competitive auction process, rather than the
traditional cost-based accounting method
that was used in Ohio before deregulation.
Total Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio
2011-2015 (millions of dollars)
Year

Shopping

SSO Auction

Total

2011

$496.70

$2,395.00

$2,891.70

2012

$443.29

$2,366.00

$2,809.29

2013

$744.11

$2,342.00

$3,086.11

2014

$824.21

$2,380.00

$3,204.21

2015

$645.19

$2,339.00

$2,984.19

Total

$3,153.30

$11,822.00

$14,975.30

Below is the update analyzed pricing data from 20162018. Total savings over the three years was around
$9 billion.
Total Savings Due to Deregulation in Ohio
2016-2018 (millions of dollars)
Year

Shopping

SSO Auction

Total

2016

$540.77

$2,553.90

$3,094.67

2017

$403.59

$2,502.10

$2,905.69

2018

$353.45

$2,612.60

$2,966.05

Total

$1,297.81

$7,668.60

$8,966.41
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Total Savings from Deregulation in Ohio
2011-2018 (millions of dollars)
Shopping

SSO

Total

$4,451.11

$19,490.60

$23,941.71

* Energy Information Agency (EIA) data, together with brokerage
data from aggregated private contracts, and aggregator pricing
discounts from the Price to Compare, were used to estimate
the total savings realized from competitive generation markets.

2.	Competition has driven down average
electricity prices in deregulated Midwestern
states (Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois), while
their regulated peers (Indiana, Michigan,
Wisconsin) have seen a steady increase in
price of generated electricity. Ratepayers
in these regulated states are saddled with
the cost of aging, uneconomic power plants,
while competitive markets in the deregulated
states have incentivized investment into new
efficient and cost-effective generation and
have accessed wider multi-state markets for
generated electricity. Deregulation has also led
to the adoption of dynamic pricing programs
and more renewable energy resource offerings.
	Competitive markets have proven to be
a powerful tool to deliver value to Ohio’s
ratepayers. Competitive rates are attractive
to businesses looking to locate in Ohio. Any
attempt to derail competitive generation markets
would cause significant harm to all of Ohio’s
electric consumers and to Ohio’s economy.
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3.	The Study Team anticipates that savings
will continue for the near term to be
around $3 billion per year. However, these
savings may be lost, in whole or in part,
if deregulated energy markets continue
to be undermined by cross subsidies of
uncompetitive Investor Owned Utility (IOU)
generation through Electric Distribution
Utility (EDU) riders and surcharges, or
through legislatively-mandated, abovemarket Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs) and subsidies.
	Despite the many benefits of competition,
there have been continuing threats to
deregulated electricity markets in Ohio.
Investor Owned Utilities have used Ohio’s
regulatory system to obtain cross-subsidies
to support their unprofitable generating facilities
through riders and surcharges collected by
their regulated Electric Distribution Companies
on consumers’ bills.
	The costs charged to Ohio consumers through
these riders and surcharges are not directly
related to the purchase of electric power itself.
These efforts have served to undermine the
billions of dollars of benefits consumers have
realized from competitive markets and have
prevented consumers from realizing the full
benefits from deregulation.

I. INTRODUCTION

In November 2016, Cleveland State University’s
Energy Policy Center, in partnership with The
Ohio State University’s John Glenn College of
Public Affairs and the Northeast Ohio Public
Energy Council, released the report “Electricity
Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has
Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.”
At that time, some investor-owned utilities were
advocating reregulation of electric generation in
Ohio, reverting to the traditional vertically integrated
monopoly model that defined the electricity industry
for most of the 20th century. The report found that
such a reversion would likely cost Ohio consumers
around $15 billion dollars over the ensuing five years.
Indeed, the report demonstrated that deregulation
had saved Ohio electricity consumers over
$14 billion between 2011-2015 as a result of
competitive generation markets.1
This updated study was undertaken to determine
if the projected savings from 2016 to present
had in fact materialized, and if not, what changes
have occurred since 2015 that may be affecting
competitive retail electricity markets. This new
study has been conducted by the same team
that researched and produced the 2016 report.

1

As of the spring of 2019, Ohio’s electricity markets
remain competitive. However, there continues to
be regulatory and legislative activity that threatens
the health, if not the existence, of competitive retail
electricity markets in Ohio. These threats include,
among other activities, the cross subsidization of
generation through surcharges and riders applied
to Ohio ratepayers by reregulating at least a portion
of Ohio’s electricity generating capacity. Shifting a
portion, if not all, of generation costs to regulated
rate-making undermines the efficient operation of
Ohio’s electricity generation market and will cost
consumers money. Moreover, subsidized generation
bid into the utility Standard Service Offer (SSO)
auctions depress Ohio’s “Price to Compare (PTC),”
the rate which competitive retailers must beat to sell
electricity. An artificially suppressed PTC reduces
the available “headroom” for CRES providers to
show value to customers while delivering acceptable
margins. This may in turn cause aggregators,
brokers and commercial retail electric service
(CRES) providers to leave Ohio’s market, easing
competitive pressure on the IOUs. This will result
in price increases that will be unchecked by
competition. Ohio would return to its old system of
regulated rate making where the cost of purchased
electricity is augmented by a guaranteed rate
of return that is approved by the Public Utility
Commission of Ohio (PUCO) – a system that our
2016 Report showed would have cost ratepayers
billions of dollars had it been continued.

 homas, et al. (2016). “Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.”
T
Retrieved from https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2420&context=urban_facpub
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What is currently an unregulated multi-state market
for electricity generation will devolve into a partially
regulated generation market. Think of electricity
that is being consumed at any point in time as a
large pool of electrons. Currently the pool is filled
by competitive purchases of electricity on an open
market with the first electrons that enter the pool
coming from the cheapest source of supply. If
demand is greater than supply after the lowest
cost electrons spill into the pool, then the next
cheapest source will continue to fill the pool. This
goes on until supply meets demand and the cost of
the last electrons to enter the pool can be thought
of as determining the cost of power. In reality it is
the average cost of all of these tranches of power
that determines the price. Electricity generating
capacity that is above the market determined price
does not enter the pool.
There are five reasons why the cost of
electricity generation will increase in a
reregulated market:
•	If the state legislature mandates that power
that is purchased with above-market rate PPAs
be the first electrons to spill into the pool,
then the most expensive power enters first
and displaces cheaper power. It makes no
difference if this power comes from subsidized
nuclear plants or new utility scale solar farms.
The trouble stems from the mandated abovemarket PPAs, coupled with subsidy. The power
that will be rationed out of the pool is likely to
be the next most expensive power source.
Arithmetic and the calculation of average
and marginal costs ensures a higher price of
purchased power under the reregulated regime
than under the existing competitive system.

2

•	The second reason why we expect the cost
of electricity generation to increase if the
market is either partially or fully reregulated is
that protected sources of generation will have
reentered the world of cost-plus pricing and
will lose their incentive to hold down costs.
•	A third wave of cost increases will come from
the capacity markets. PJM Interconnection,
the regional transmission organization
that covers Ohio, runs auctions for power
generation and from reserve generation
capacity (termed capacity markets), in addition
to auctioning off room in its transmission lines.
To protect the capacity markets from being
undermined by state-subsidized power and
predatory pricing, PJM offsets the cost of the
subsidy by assessing fees on power users
in the subsidizing states. Runnerstone, an
independent energy analytical consulting firm,
puts this cost at $80 million a year.2
•	The supply-side domino effect will also
contribute to the long-term increase on the
cost of power. If the newly protected sources of
electrons push Ohio-located production out of
the market, those producers, their employees,
and their elected officials will call a foul and insist
on equal protection. If they have either enough
political power or political sympathy as victims
of legislatively-enabled market rigging, they too
may earn above-market PPAs and shove the
next highest producer out of the pool.

 ader, Jordan and Seryak, “FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. Recommended Changes to Wholesale Electricity Markets to Address Power
N
Plant Subsidies.” Runnerstone, May 16, 2019. https://ohiomfg.informz.net/ohiomfg/data/images/PJM%20memo-may2019.pdf
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•	The fifth reason to expect prices to increase
is the deterrence of new, low cost, sources of
power from entering the generating market as
the market is draped in legislatively mandated
protection. Natural gas generation that is
not owned by IOUs is, for instance, price
competitive. This has unleashed consumer
savings throughout the PJM territory, including
Ohio. In a flat, or slowly growing power market,
the return on investment for new generation
depends on higher cost, inefficient, sources
of power leaving the market. If higher cost
power does not leave due to legislative action,
then there is no room for competitive supply,
investment will not take place, and prices
will rise once again.3 The cumulative effect is
higher profits for the legacy power producers,
increased costs for consumers, and diminished
economic prospects for Ohioans. Protected
power generation is an anti-economic
development policy.
We estimate that deregulation of retail electricity
markets has delivered $8.7 billion in savings to
Ohio customers from 2016-2018. In total, since
2011, Ohio’s consumers have saved $23.9 billion
as a result of electricity deregulation. This updated
study confirms the continued savings to Ohio
consumers of about $3 billion per year from Ohio
electric generation deregulation. These projected
savings assume that Ohio’s General Assembly does
not enact legislation that subsidizes uncompetitive
power generators and does not re-regulate utility
scale green generating sources owned by IOUs.

3

 iderewicz, William. H.B. 6 Testimony to the Energy Generation Subcommittee of the Energy and Natural Resource Committee of the
S
Ohio House of Representatives, April 24, 2019.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Study Team’s 2016 report contained a literature
review highlighting a wide range of studies focused
on measuring the impact of deregulation on
electricity prices. These studies concluded that
deregulation generally led to a decrease in electricity
prices. The degree and timing of this impact were
dependent upon the regulatory structure in which
each competitive electricity market operates.4 Some
regulatory environments more readily promote the
transfer of competitive benefits to ratepayers, while
others limit the opportunities for consumers to realize
these benefits.
Since 2016, several important new reports have
emerged that shed additional light on the value of
deregulation. The first, written by Philip O’Conner
in 2017, was an update of a 2015 study, and
directly compares the rate of change in weighted
average price between regulated and competitive
markets.5 The 2017 report extends the analysis
beyond the five Midwestern states originally
examined, comparing the prices of 35 monopoly
states to 14 competitive states. Figure 1 shows
O’Connor’s 2017 findings. The study demonstrates

that while “all sector” prices in competitive states
have dropped nearly 18% since 2011, they have
simultaneously gone up nearly 3% in monopoly
states, for a 21% difference in growth rates.
FIGURE 1: Inflation-Adjusted Weighted
Average Percentage Price Change by
Rate Class, Choice vs. Monopoly States,
2008-2016
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%

Competitive States (14)

2.55% 5.44%

0.17%
-3.12%

Monopoly States (35)

-10.04%
-17.93%
-22.88%
-30.12%
All Sectors

Residential

Commercial

Industrial

Source: O’Connor6

4

Thomas, et al., supra.

5

 ’Connor, P. & O’Connell-Diaz, E. (2015). “Evolution of the Revolution: The sustained success of retail electricity competition.”
O
COMPETE. Retrieved from: http://www.competecoalition.com/files/COMPETE%20White%20Paper_Evolution%20of%20Revolution_
Final.pdf

6

 ’Connor, O. (2017). “Restructuring Recharged: The Superior Performance of Competitive Electricity Markets 2008-2018.” Retrieved
O
from https://www.resausa.org/sites/default/files/RESA_Restructuring_Recharged_White%20Paper_0.pdf
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The second study, by Noah Dormady, et al, (2019)
considers, among other issues, the impact of Ohio’s
incomplete deregulation on the ability of ratepayers to
realize the full value of competition.7 Dormady utilized
complete electricity bill data from the Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio (PUCO) to examine “all-in”
prices. They found that due to rate-setting practices
in Ohio, IOUs have been able to recover losses
incurred from non-competitive power generating
plants through non-bypassable charges placed
onto regulated, distribution bills.8 While generation
prices have significantly decreased in Ohio since
deregulation, these savings have not always lead
to a corresponding reduction in total electricity bills
of consumers. The expansion of non-bypassable
charges that the PUCO allowed the IOUs to recover
has masked, in part or in whole, the $3 billion annual
savings derived from deregulation in Ohio. The lesson
learned from Dormady et al. applies equally as well

to electricity regulation and magicians: to understand
what is happening always watch the other hand. In
the case of regulation, it is the mandatory costs not
associated with power generation that takes the
place of the magician’s hand not holding the scarf.
A third important recent study found that competitive
markets have additional benefits for all consumers
beyond better prices. According to Morey, Matthew
and Kirsch (2016), deregulation has expanded the
adoption of dynamic pricing programs, such as
time-of-use rates and real-time pricing. These pricing
options work to improve the allocation of power
system resources (efficiency), to lower the costs of
power production, and to improve resource adequacy
(system reliability).9 Additionally, states with retail
choice better promote renewable resources both
through greater investment into renewable generation
and by providing more options for consumers to
purchase green energy exclusively.10

7

 ormady, et al. (2019). “Who Pays for Retail Electric Deregulation?: Evidence of Cross Subsidization from Complete Bill Data.” The
D
Energy Journal, 40(2): 161-194.

8
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 orey, Matthew and Laurence Kirsch (2016). “Retail Choice in Electricity: What Have We Learned in 20 Years?” Electric Markets
M
Research Foundation.
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III. CHALLENGES IN ANALYZING
ELECTRICITY PRICES

The complex nature of electricity prices creates
challenges to isolating the effect of competitive
electric markets on the consumer’s cost of power.
Due to the way data are collected and reported,
it can be difficult to separate the regulated and
deregulated portions of the price. Also confused
is the reported price of purchasing power (the
purchased price of electricity without transmission,
distribution, and other charges), and the “all-in”
price of power (including generating, transmission,
distribution, and other mandated charges). In Ohio,
the mandated charges are referred to as “riders.”
Regulated utilities generally do not break down
these costs and report them publicly in a fashion
that enables easy comparison across service
territories or states.
This lack of transparency limits the ability to study
the effects of deregulation. Most studies, as a
result of this practice, use reported “all-in” prices
which encompass both regulated and deregulated
components (further discussed in Section V). Such
“bundled” price data are readily available from
the Energy Information Agency (EIA). However,

11

private retail contracts that beat the standard
service offers are not included in EIA data. As a
result, any study that relies solely on EIA data will
likely overstate the generating cost of electricity
by relying on the standard service offer (SSO)
and not on the competitive price of power that is
reflected in bill data. This overstatement increases
with the amount of power used by a customer. It
is smallest with residential customers and largest
with industrial customers and energy-intensive
users such as data centers. EIA data do not fully
measure savings from deregulation.
This study assesses the savings realized both from
competitive auctions setting the Price to Compare,
as reflected in the EIA data, as well as from retail
shopping. Statistical techniques were deployed to
estimate the impact of deregulation on the Price
to Compare. These techniques are explained in
more detail in Section VII. In addition, private retail
contracts were aggregated and examined
to estimate the savings from shopping. In Ohio,
57% of consumers, accounting for 79% of the
total consumption, shop for their power,11 and in
so doing, over time generally beat the PTC.

PUCO. (2019). Retail Market Activity: Switching Rate Percentage (Customer Count). https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiMjU1Z
WRkNGUtYmJmZS00YTEyLTk5NWYtMGE1NmJmZjYxMzVjIiwidCI6IjUwZjhmY2M0LTk0ZDgtNGYwNy04NGViLTM2ZWQ1N2M3Yzhh
MiJ9
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To capture this additional value to consumers
from shopping, the Study Team aggregated
data from private sources for larger “mercantile”
users of electricity (customers that use more
than 700,000 kilowatt hours (kWh) a year). The
effects of deregulation on smaller “non-mercantile”
consumers (residential and some commercial
users) in Ohio were estimated by applying
the discount rates negotiated by a municipal
government aggregator, Northeast Ohio Public
Energy Council (NOPEC) through 2017. These
rates were assumed to be representative of
savings offered to non-mercantile electricity
shoppers across the state.
For mercantile customers, the Study Team
used broker data aggregated from Competitive
Retail Electric Service (CRES) retail energy
supply contracts. Data were gathered from
over 1,000 accounts and aggregated to maintain
confidentiality. Contracts were gathered from all
four territories served by Ohio’s investor-owned
utilities: FirstEnergy, AEP Ohio, Duke Energy,
and Dayton Power & Light.

12

Average load factors and average electricity
consumption for each of the rate classes were
used to model electricity prices. This method helps
create “apples to apples” comparisons between
each rate class’s PTC and the privately contracted
cost of generated electricity. This method is
also consistent with the practices used by the
professional staff of the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio.12 The average load factor assumed for
the mercantile primary rate class was 67 percent,
with an average annual consumption, or usage,
of 3 million kWhs. The average load factor
assumed for the mercantile secondary rate
class was 47 percent, with annual usage of
1 million kWhs.

 ublic Utilities Commission of Ohio. (2013). “In The Matter of the Commission’s Review of Customer Rate Impacts from Ohio Power
P
Company’s Transition to Market Based Rates.” PUCO Case Number 13-1530-EL-UNC, Attachment 1A. Retrieved from: https://dis.
puc.state.oh.us/CaseRecord.aspx?CaseNo=13-1530.
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IV. OHIO’S COMPETITIVE MARKET

A. OVERVIEW OF DEREGULATION IN OHIO
A comprehensive history of Ohio’s path to
deregulation can be found in the Study Team’s initial
report posted in 2016. This overview highlights the
key aspects of Ohio’s restructuring and provides
context for the ensuing analysis of the state’s
electricity market.
Ohio’s journey to deregulation began in the 1990s in
response to increased pressure from commercial and
industrial users. These users sought greater direct
access to wholesale markets to decrease costs of
production and other utility-related expenses.
Increasing electricity prices during this time period
threatened Ohio’s manufacturing base, as many
industrial users began to move out of the state.13
In 1999, Ohio’s General Assembly passed Senate Bill
3, which initiated restructuring of the electricity
generation in the state. The Bill required electric
utilities to allow consumers to choose their electric
retail suppliers, beginning in 2001. However, the bill
mandated a five-year “market development” period,
which provided utilities time to transition to a

competitive generation market. During this time, retail
rates were frozen. After “market development” ended,
the PUCO extended retail rate freezes through a “rate
stabilization period,” further delaying the development
of a competitive retail energy market.14
In 2007, Ohio’s then-Governor sought to fix the
regulatory structure in Ohio after determining that
deregulation was “not working.”15 This was proposed
under an “Energy, Jobs, and Progress Plan,” with the
goal of remaking the regulatory structure under which
utilities operate, and advancing the development of
renewable energy in Ohio.16 The plan was introduced
as Senate Bill 221.
Senate Bill 221 introduced market-based ratemaking
into Ohio’s retail market. The Bill required utilities to
remain the “provider of last resort,” or the supplier
that provides default service if a consumer fails to
choose an alternative provider. The rate paid by
non-shoppers who retain the default service is called
the - the “Price to Compare” which is the sum of the
“Standard Service Offer” and all other by-passable
riders as approved by the PUCO under Senate Bill
221. The SSOs are set through a competitive

13

 homas, et al. (2016). “Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.”
T
Retrieved from https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2420&context=urban_facpub

14

 ublic Utilities Commission of Ohio. (2007), “Electric Rate Stabilization Plans: Ensuring Rate Certainty in Ohio.” Retrieved from: http://
P
www.getpurenergy.com/states/forms/Electric%20Rate%20Stabilization.pdf.
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 ittlechild, S. (2007), “Municipal Aggregation and Retail Aggregation in the Ohio Sector.” Retrieved from: http://www.eprg.group.cam.
L
ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/eprg0715.pdf.
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 ricker & Eckler. (2008). “Ohio Senate Bill 221: A Summary of Its Advanced Energy and Energy Efficiency Provisions.” Retrieved from:
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wholesale energy power market intended to align
price-to-compare (PTC) rates with wholesale prices
and allow customers to realize the benefits of
competition, whether or not they actively shop for

electricity.17 Since 2011, retail electricity markets have
grown rapidly in Ohio, as has shopping. Likewise,
since 2011, the SSO generation auctions have
attracted considerable competition.

FIGURE 2: Ohio Electricity Market Restructuring Timeline
Regulatory / Legislative Events
SB 3 takes effect,
competition introduced
to OH’s retail electric
market (7/6/1999)

Recovery of
generation
stranded costs
ends (12/31/2005)

Market development period
(1/1/2001 to 12/31/2005)

Rate stabilization
plans end for AEP,
FirstEnergy, and
Duke (12/31/2008)

Rate stabilization
plans take effect
(1/1/2006)

Recovery of
regulatory
stranded costs
ends (12/31/2010)

PUCO approves initial
ESPs (12/17/2008 to
6/24/2009)

Rate stabilization
plan ends for DP&L
(12/31/2010)

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

First MRO/ESP
proposals from AEP,
Duke, and FirstEnergy
(7/31/2008)
First MRO/ESP
proposal from
DP&L (10/10/2008)

First competitive
SSO auction for
Duke (12/14/2011)

First competitive
SSO auction
for FirstEnergy
(5/13/2009)

First competitive
SSO auction for
AEP (2/25/2014)

First competitive
SSO auction for
DP&L (10/28/2013)

Source: Noah Dormady, et al, Ohio State University (2016)
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B. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT
REGULATORY STRUCTURE
While Senate Bill 221 fixed some of the problems
with Ohio’s first restructuring effort, the regulatory
structure remained imperfect. The problems
manifest in two principal ways. First, the legislation
failed to mandate the complete divestiture of
generation facilities from Electric Distribution
Utilities, the latter of which remain fully regulated.
Rather, SB 221 continued to allow for “corporate”
separation of regulated and unregulated assets,
allowing utilities to maintain ownership and control
over their generation fleet as subsidiary
corporations.18 With the regulated side of their
businesses enjoying a guaranteed rate of return of
as much as 11%, the utilities were incentivized to
find ways to transfer generation costs to their
Electric Distribution Utilities, especially as their
aging generation fleets and their sources of
generating fuel became increasingly uncompetitive.
The IOUs were able to use their regulated
operations to financially support, or cross-subsidize,
their generation business because of the incomplete
separation of assets. They also failed to aggressively
write-down the value of their generating assets with
the “stranded asset” payments awarded to the
PUCO. This cross-subsidization diminished the
benefits that consumers should have realized from
deregulation. Failing to spin off their uncompetitive
generating fleets and not tying their values to

market was a business or financial bet that went
wrong for AEP, Dayton Power and Light, and most
disastrously for FirstEnergy. Incomplete separation
threatens to undermine competitive electricity
markets in Ohio, including the Standard Service
Offer auction.
Second, Senate Bill 221 allowed utilities to continue
to set rates through cost-of-service proposals
(Electric Security Plans, or ESPs), rather than a
competitive bidding process (Market Rate Offers,
or MROs). The Bill provided these two avenues for
rate-making, but to date, only ESPs have been filed
with the PUCO. Through ESPs, utilities can assess
“riders” in the non-bypassable portion of
customers’ electricity bills, so the charges are
unable to be avoided through shopping. The
PUCO’s hearing process for ESPs has resulted in
the investor-owned utilities getting approval for cost
recovery measures and cross-subsidization without
much difficulty.19 Additionally, oversight over how
the money recovered from these “riders” is
ultimately spent has been startlingly limited. In
2017, for instance, the PUCO approved a
“distribution modernization rider” for FirstEnergy
customers, through which the utility collected
$168 million that year. The PUCO did not require
any specific projects related to grid modernization
in relation to the collected funds and FirstEnergy
had not, as of the date this report was finalized,
reported on how it has used the funds.20

18

Dormady, et al. (2018). “Do markets make good commissioners? A quasi-experimental analysis of retail electric restructuring in
Ohio.” Journal of Public Policy, 1-33. Retrieved from: https://doi-org.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/10.1017/S0143814X18000168
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Indeed, FirstEnergy has made no secret about
what the distribution modernization rider (DMR)
money is for: according to testimony FirstEnergy
provided to the PUCO, the purpose of Rider DMR
is to provide “credit support” to enable the
company to be able to, at some future date,
acquire capital for future distribution upgrades.21
In short, the funds from the DMR had been
expressly earmarked to shore up FirstEnergy’s
failed finances stemming from its uncompetitive
generation fleet. The PUCO approved this charge,
awarding FirstEnergy over $600 million in subsidies
through 2019. FirstEnergy applied with the PUCO
for a two year extension of this DMR rider.22
As background to the DMR rider, FirstEnergy
had previously sought nearly $8 billion in Power
Purchase Agreements tied to its nuclear and coal
plants. This was approved by the PUCO, but later
disallowed by Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission because it put regional electricity
retail markets at risk. Having failed to get relief
with above market PPAs, FirstEnergy sought

another end run on deregulation by asking the
PUCO to approve a “retail rate stability” rider,
totaling $4.46 billion to support the company’s coal
and nuclear plants. The PUCO did not grant this,
but instead gave FirstEnergy the aforementioned
$600 million DMR.23 In short, FirstEnergy was able
to obtain subsidies for its upside down generation
fleet by simply re-characterizing the generation
subsidy as “distribution modernization.” What they
lost in a competitive marketplace they clawed back
through the regulatory process.
The Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council
(NOPEC), the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association
(OMA), and others challenged the legality of
FirstEnergy’s DMR rider, arguing that it was an
illegal cross subsidy of FirstEnergy’s unregulated
generation fleet through non-bypassable charges
collected by its regulated distribution companies. In
June of 2019, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with
NOPEC and OMA, determining that the DMR rider
was an impermissible charge, because, among
other reasons, FirstEnergy was not required to
invest the money into modernizing the grid.24

21

 UCO, Rehearing Rebuttal and Surrebuttal Testimony of Eileen M. Mikkelson on Behalf of Ohio Edison Company, The Cleveland
P
Electric Illuminating Company, the Toledo Edison Company, Case No. 14-1297-EL-SSO, July 25, 2016, at p. 5.
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See D. Trevas, “FirstEnergy Grid Modernization Charge Improperly Imposed,” Court News Ohio, June 19, 2019, found at:
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C. CURRENT STATE OF SHOPPING
The competitive electricity supply industry evolved slowly in Ohio, as the state’s initial regulatory structure
did not provide an attractive market place for competitors. In 2008, 90% of the megawatt hour (MWh)
sales in Ohio were purchased by defaulting to the SSOs.25 However, since 2008, Ohio has attracted
dozens of CRES providers, who have made significant market gains in the past 10 years. In 2018, 79.4% of
all MWh sold in Ohio were sold through CRES providers, accounting for 57% of all electric power
customers.26 Figure 3 below shows the growth of shopping in Ohio. In 2018, commercial retail electric
service providers sold more than 70% of all MWh in each utility territory.27
FIGURE 3: Percentage of Ohio Energy Sold to Shoppers in Each Utility Territory, 2008-2018
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V. RECENT TRENDS IN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS

Since our 2016 report, there have been two
significant trends affecting regional competitive
electricity markets: 1) the closing of some
uneconomic power plants and a subsequent
introduction of subsidies to support a few of the
remaining plants; and 2) a push towards increased
choice and new efforts for restructuring.
A. PLANT CLOSURES AND SUBSIDIES
As independent power producers invest into
efficient, cost-effective generation facilities, natural
gas prices remain low, load remains flat, and
society’s demand for renewable energy increases,
utilities are facing difficulty profiting from older,
coal-fired and nuclear power plants. The electricity
generated from these plants struggles to compete
on the wholesale market.
The unhealthy economic status of older generation
facilities has forced many utilities to shutter
plants ahead of schedule. Most recently, the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) chose to retire
its Paradise and Bull Run coal plants in Kentucky
and Tennessee respectively. TVA’s board faced
great political pressure to keep them open, as the
country’s mix of fuel used to generate power has
become an increasingly politicized topic. However,

TVA’s president made clear that the decision was,
“not about coal. Rather, this decision is about
economics.”29 TVA serves southern Kentucky
and a connecting piece of southwestern Virginia;
residents of most of Tennessee, as well as those
who live in adjoining western North Carolina, are
TVA’s customers; sophisticated manufacturing
employers in northern Mississippi benefit from
TVA’s rates, as do those in northern Alabama’s
Muscle Shoals and Huntsville regions. Chattanooga
and Atlanta’s northern suburbs are also customers
of TVA. In other words, a good portion of Ohio’s
day-to-day economic competition purchases
power from TVA.
Free market reality has driven utilities to demand
subsidies to support their uneconomic generation
facilities. Such subsidies have been the source of
much debate on both the federal and state level,
with stakeholders battling over the validity of utility
arguments around the value of the uneconomic
plants. Utilities contend that both coal and nuclear
fueled power generation are key to system
reliability and resiliency as they provide baseline
generation and create fuel diversity.30 Supporters
of nuclear subsidies also argue for the fuel source’s
importance to meet low emission goals.

29

Bruggers, James. (2019). “TVA Votes to Close 2 Coal Plants Despite Political Pressure from Trump and Kentucky GOP. Inside Climate
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Numerous states have introduced legislation
to support coal and nuclear plants, including
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Montana,
New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. The Department
of Energy is also looking into methods of federal
financial support for the at-risk power plants.31
In Ohio, IOUs have been repeatedly asking for
generation subsidies for uneconomic power plants
through both the PUCO and the state legislation.
For example in 2016, AEP was able to get the
PUCO to subsidize aging coal plants in Ohio
and Indiana.32 These plants, originally built in the
1950s, are owned by a collective of IOUs, including
FirstEnergy, Duke, AEP, and Dayton Power &
Light.33 After Ohio introduced electric competition,
the utilities voluntarily extended their contract with
these coal plants through June 2040. The PUCO
ratemaking ensured that AEP received guaranteed
income from the plants by shifting the risk of the
utilities’ decision making in a competitive market

to Ohio’s consumers, through their distribution
bills.34 In other words, AEP was granted an abovemarket-rate PPA to shelter AEP’s asset value and
shareholders from a business decision that went
bad, even though over half of the power produced
comes from power boilers located in Indiana and
even though the decision was made after the Ohio
legislature encouraged the utility to separate its
generating fleet from the rest of the company.
FirstEnergy has championed many of these
attempts to support aging coal and nuclear
facilities. The Northeast Ohio investor-owned
utility has been hit particularly hard changes in
the relative cost of fuels used to produce electric
power. The utility’s unregulated generation
subsidiary, FirstEnergy Solutions, filed for
bankruptcy in March of 2018 as a result of its
dependence on uncompetitive coal and nuclear
plants. The bankruptcy occurred after a failed
appeal to the Department of Energy to issue an
emergency order for cost recovery.35
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B. INCREASED CONSUMER CHOICE
Recent years have seen a significant increase in states taking measures to transition from the traditional
vertical monopoly structure towards a market with greater choice for consumers. Table 1 outlines the
various efforts across the country to both introduce and further support competition and choice rather
than monopolized electricity markets. While some initiatives are top-down, many are being driven
by citizens and industry demanding greater economic freedom and ability to choose electric service
providers. Not every effort will result in deregulation, but the trend towards choice suggest that
consumers prefer competitive markets over utility monopolies.
TABLE 1: Highlights of Consumer Choice Across the Country36
State(s)

Effort

California

Community Choice Aggregators have experienced a rapid expansion and are projected to serve more than
50% of California’s load by 2020.37 The California Public Utilities Commission is researching an expansion
of direct access customer choice.

Minnesota

New legislation was introduced to provide large industrial consumers the opportunity to purchase
electricity from market-priced independent power producers.

Missouri

Legislation has been introduced to allow Commercial and Industrial consumers over a certain load
threshold to purchase renewable power.

Washington

The state’s Utilities Commission allowed Microsoft to produce energy from independent power producers
in the wholesale market. Additional efforts are underway to provide similar choice to other large industrial
consumers.

Florida

There is a push to amend Florida’s state constitution to declare that it is the state’s policy to establish
a competitive market for electricity and provide ratepayers the right to choose their electricity provider
threshold to purchase renewable power.

Michigan

In 2016, Michigan protected its limited choice program against an existential legislative threat. Residents as
well as commercial and industrial users have shown support for the expansion of the current 10% limit on
electricity choice.

Arizona,
Oregon, and
Virginia

Large commercial and industrial users in each state are increasingly pressuring regulators to initiate or
expand choice programs.

Nebraska and
Kansas

Proposed bills in 2017 would unbundle rates and start a movement towards increased retail choice.

36
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VI. DEREGULATION’S EFFECTS ON
OHIO ELECTRICITY PRICES

A. COMPONENTS OF ELECTRICITY PRICE
The “all-in” price of electricity is comprised of a variety of components: the purchase price of generated
electricity, capacity or generation reserves, the regulated costs of transmission and distribution, and a
series of regulatory approved add-on charges called “riders”. In a deregulated electricity market, only the
generating price of power and capacity charges are directly affected by competition, and they are but
a portion of the final bill, while other elements remain regulated. The table below provides a high-level
overview of the major components of electricity price for a commercial customer in Ohio.
TABLE 2: Components of Electricity Price
Price
Component

Regulated or Deregulated

Description

Energy

Deregulated, not part of
Electric Distribution Utility
cost

The cost of generating electricity.

Capacity

Auction managed by
PJM, not part of Electric
Distribution Utility cost

Capacity consists of dedicated generation reserves, designed to “meet
the demand for the future” and ensure long-term grid reliability. Capacity
costs are determined in a three-year-ahead annual auction.

Ancillary
Charges

Managed by PJM, not part
of Electric Distribution Utility
cost

Ancillary services result from a range of costs incurred by PJM through
managing the grid. These charges generally fall into two categories:
regulation services, which maintain system frequency, and operating
reserves, which provide back-up power in emergency situations.

Line Losses

Not part of Electric
Distribution Utility costs

Line losses account for energy that is lost while transmitting electricity
along transmission and distribution lines.

Transmission

Regulated, part of Electric
Distribution Utility cost

Transmission charges allow utilities to recover the costs of transporting
electricity from generating plants to distribution systems as well as the
costs of maintaining the grid. All transmission costs are non-bypassable
(cannot be avoided through shopping).

Distribution

Regulated, part of Electric
Distribution Utility cost

Distribution accounts for the costs of delivery of low-voltage electricity to
end-users. These costs are set by state regulators through tariffs. These
costs include both distribution and demand charges, and cannot be
bypassed.

Non-Bypassable
Riders

Regulated, part of Electric
Distribution Utility cost

Riders are costs that are assessed with the approval of the PUCO. These
charges are numerous, vary in purpose, and traditionally small. However,
they have been growing rapidly in recent years. Non-bypassable riders
cannot be avoided by shopping.

Bypassable
Riders

Regulated, part of Electric
Distribution Utility cost

Bypassable riders are costs generally associated with generation service.
Shopping customers can avoid these charges if they shop with a CRES.
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Each component accounts for a distinct portion
of an end-user’s retail electricity price. The relative
weight of each element has changed since the
emergence of competitive markets in Ohio. The cost
structure has shifted significantly since the Study
Team’s previous report. Figures 4 and 5, below
show the changing nature of total electricity price for
shopping mercantile customers in Ohio. Mercantile
customers are industrial and commercial users that
consume greater than 700,000 kWh/year.
FIGURE 4: Approximate Structure of
Electricity Price for Mercantile Users
in Ohio, 2016
Energy

14%

Capacity

13%

48%

8%
12%

3%
2%

Ancillary
Losses
Transmission

B. ELECTRICITY PRICE TRENDS IN OHIO

Distribution

1. Trends in Non-Bypassable Charges

NBP Riders

FIGURE 5: Approximate Structure of
Electricity Price for Mercantile Users
in Ohio, 2018
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Between 2016 and 2018 the energy portion of the
total bill decreased by 7%, while non-bypassable
riders portion of the bill increased 7%. This
continued a trend in the makeup of electricity costs
for Ohio consumers: as the energy (generation)
component of the bill decreased in response to the
pressures of a competitive markets, distribution
charges and non-bypassable riders have increased
in response to pressure from IOUs on the PUCO
to increase the regulated costs, and, of course, the
noncompetitive profit that comes with regulation.
Overall, the regulated portion of retail electricity
prices in Ohio (transmission, distribution, and
non-bypassable riders) has increased from 35%
of the total bill to 43%. On the other hand, the
deregulated components have decreased from
65% to 57% of the all-in price. This trend is
discussed further in the below section.

Distribution
NBP Riders

As described above, the regulated portion of
Ohio consumers’ electric bills has been steadily
increasing since the development of a competitive
retail energy markets. This trend is even more
pronounced when specific the rate classes from
specific Electric Distribution Utilities (the local
distribution subsidiaries of the IOUs) are examined.
Table 3, below, breaks down percentages of the
regulated and deregulated portions of the bill for
AEP, FirstEnergy, and Duke’s Secondary rate
classes. Rate classes are determined by voltage
level and the Secondary rate class contains
a majority of commercial and small industrial
customers.38 The table compares these percentages
in 2011 and 2019 to exhibit the market trend.

“ Secondary” is a designation by the utility to describe the voltage level delivered to the customer. Secondary is on the “low” side of the
transformer after it has been stepped down. In AEP territory, the Secondary Rate Class includes nominal regulated voltages of 120,
120/208, 120/240 or 240/480 volts, single phase and 120/208, 120/240, 240, 240/280, 277/280 and 480 volts, 3 phase.
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TABLE 3: Regulated vs. Deregulated Portions of Total Price for
Commercial and Small Industrial Customers in 2011 and 201939
AEP CS GS3S
Regulated
Deregulated
Total Price/kWh

FirstEnergy OE Secondary

Duke Secondary

2011

2019

2011

2019

2011

2019

32%

49%

31%

47%

29%

35%

68%

51%

69%

53%

71%

65%

$0.089

$.099

$0.101

$0.102

$0.123

$.081

For ratepayers in AEP and FirstEnergy territories,
the regulated portion of the all-in electricity price
jumped 17 and 16 percentage points respectively
from 2011 to 2019. Increases in the regulated price
components for commercial customers in AEP
and FirstEnergy’s territory wholly offset the savings
realized from the competitive generation market.
On the other hand, Duke only experienced a 6%
increase in the regulated portion of its bill during
this same time period. This increase, however,
coincided with a $0.042 drop in total price
per kWh. In the Duke territory, unlike AEP and
FirstEnergy, the deregulated savings were not
overwhelmed by rising costs on the regulated side.
2. Comparison of Price Components in
Duke and FirstEnergy Territories
A comparison of FirstEnergy’s and Duke’s price
components makes clear the different experiences
of secondary rate class customers in the two
territories. Figures 6 and 7 show the breakdown
of electricity price for FirstEnergy’s Secondary
rate class in the utility’s Ohio Edison territory for
January 2011 and January 2019.

FIGURE 6: FirstEnergy Ohio Edison
Secondary (Commercial and Small Industrial)
Cost Breakdown, January 2011
Bypassable

14%

Non Bypassable

17%
65%

SSO
Bypassable Riders
Distribution

4%

Non Bypassable Riders
Total Price: $0.101/kWh

FIGURE 7: FirstEnergy Ohio Edison
Secondary (Commercial and Small Industrial)
Cost Breakdown, January 2019
Bypassable
Non Bypassable

31%
52%
16%
1%

SSO
Bypassable Riders
Distribution
Non Bypassable Riders

Total Price: $0.102/kWh

39

 he defining characteristics of a “secondary” rate class varies by utility. Generally, this rate class includes primarily large
T
commercial users.
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This comparison between FirstEnergy’s price
components in 2011 and 2019 describes the nature
of the dramatic changes in the composition of
electric bills set forth in Table 3 above. While the
SSO in FirstEnergy dropped by 13 percentage
points as a portion of the total cost (a 20%
decrease), the non-bypassable Riders more than
doubled over the same time period, from 14% to
31% of the overall price (increasing by 121%). The
increase in non-bypassable riders accounts for the
entirety of the increase in the regulated portion of
the total price. These riders offset the drop in the
SSO and prevented ratepayers from realizing an
overall price decrease.

FIGURE 9: Duke Secondary (Commercial
and Small Industrial) Cost Breakdown,
January 2019

For comparison, Figures 8 and 9 breakdown the
total price for Duke’s Secondary rate class.

Although Duke’s distribution costs increased by
9 percentage points, its non-bypassable rider
percentage fell by 4%, and its overall price fell by
$0.042/kWh. Duke’s Secondary rate class saw a
34% decrease in the percentage of its all-in costs
once a competitive market was established. This is
a startling contrast to the experience of commercial
customers in FirstEnergy’s territory.

FIGURE 8: Duke Secondary (Commercial
and Small Industrial) Cost Breakdown,
January 2011
Bypassable

15%

Non Bypassable
34%

11%

Bypassable Riders

4%
36%

Total Price: $0.123/kWh
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SSO
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Non Bypassable Riders

Bypassable

11%

Non Bypassable

20%

SSO
65%

Bypassable Riders (0%)
Transmission

4%
0%

Distribution
Total Price: $0.081/kWh

Non Bypassable Riders

3. Cross-Subsidization
So why did Duke’s ratepayers realize greater
actual savings benefits from deregulation than
their counterparts in FirstEnergy territories? A key
difference between Duke and FirstEnergy is that
Duke sold off its generation assets to a third party,
while FirstEnergy (as well as AEP) retained its
fleet in a wholly owned unregulated subsidiary.40
In short, Duke functionally separated its Ohio
regulated business from its deregulated business,
while FirstEnergy placed its fleet in a wholly owned
subsidiary company. In other words, Duke sold off
its fleet while FirstEnergy still owned its generating
plants. FirstEnergy’s operational structure creates
incentives for the company to delay marking down

 R Newswire (2015). “Duke Energy completes sale of its non-regulated Midwest generation business to Dynegy.” Retrieved from:
P
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/duke-energy-completes-sale-of-its-non-regulated-midwest-generation-business-todynegy-300060392.html

Update on Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio

27

the asset value of its loss-making generating plants
and to try to recoup losses from its generating
subsidiary by using its political power to influence
the regulatory process. Dormady explains that,
“Ohio failed to remove generation from the balance
sheets of utilities yet retained a regulatory ratesetting mechanism for utilities to obtain additional
cost recovery that was entirely shielded from
competitive pressures of retail choice.”41
Dormady found that overall prices increased in
every Electric Distribution Utility territory except for
Duke, which is the only Ohio utility that completely
divested its generation fleet.42 Dormady points out
that the decision made by Duke to sell off its fleet
and the decisions made by FirstEnergy, AEP, and
Dayton Power and Light to place their fleets in
wholly-owned subsidiary corporations created a
“unique natural experiment” in Ohio.43
Dormady argues that in a competitive market,
decreases in the price of key generating fuel, like
natural gas, should deliver savings to consumers.
However, Ohio consumers outside of the Duke’s
territory have not realized such savings. Dormady
postulates that this is because falling natural gas
prices result in concurrent losses attributed to the
operations of nuclear and coal generating plants,
and for the IOUs that still own and operate nuclear
and coal power plants, there were strong incentives
to recoup these losses through the regulated side
of their businesses.44
4. SSO Trends
Since deregulation, utilities have used a mixture of
both auctions and cost-based generation (cost-ofservice plus a guaranteed return on investment,
sometimes referred to herein as the “cost-plus”
method) approaches to determine the PTC. As
utilities in Ohio phased in the use of auctions to

determine their PTCs, the benefits of competition
have driven down prices. Figure 10 shows how
a competitive auction process impacted Duke’s
PTC. In 2011, when Duke transitioned to 100%
auction pricing, its pricing for secondary mercantile
customers dropped 37%, from 9 cents a kWh
to 5.7 cents a kWh. Since 2011, Duke’s PTC in
this rate class decreased due to the effects of a
competitive market. The savings totaled 5.2 cents/
kWh in 2019.
FIGURE 10: Duke Secondary
(Large Commercial) PTC and
Average Contract Rate, 2010-2019
$0.10

Shift to 100% Auction

$0.08
$0.06
$0.04
$0.02
$0.00
Jan 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Price to Compare

Average Contract Rate

Similar trends can be seen in AEP’s Columbus
Southern territory as the utility begins to phase
in auction-based pricing (seen in Figure 11). AEP
phased in its auction pricing over a 12-month
period. In 2014, still 90% of AEP’s price to compare
was determined by the cost-plus method. By
January of 2015, AEP transitioned to 100% auction
pricing, driving down the price 15%, from 10.16
cents per kWh to 8.65 cents per kWh. In June of
2015, AEP’s auction process drove the PTC down
an additional 32% to 5.88 cents/kWh. Between
2011 and 2015, auction pricing reduced the PTC in
AEP’s Columbus Southern secondary rate class by

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Dormady, et al. (2019). “Who Pays for Retail Electric Deregulation?: Evidence of Cross Subsidization from Complete Bill Data.”
The Energy Journal, 40(2): 161-194.

44

Id.
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42.13%. By 2019, AEP’s PTC in this rate class was
down to 5.05 cents per kWh, an additional 14%
decrease from 2015.
FIGURE 11: AEP Columbus Southern
Secondary (Large Commercial) PTC and
Average Contract Rate, 2010 - 2019
$0.12

Begin Shift to Auction

$0.10

100% Auction

$0.08
$0.06

compete. As the PTC and contract rate converge,
avoided costs through shopping shrink. In 2011,
the early stage of competitive markets, avoided
costs in all utility territories across Ohio averaged
22%.46 As markets matured, avoided costs quickly
dropped. Table 4 sets forth the avoided costs for
the Secondary Mercantile market in each utility
territory. In the last three years, avoided costs
appear to have stabilized at around 8% in this rate
class. Additional data on avoided costs from 20112018 can be found in Appendix 1.

$0.02

TABLE 4: Average Avoided Costs from
Shopping in Secondary Mercantile Markets
By Utility Territory 2016-2018

$0.00

As competitive markets mature, we should expect

$0.04

Jan 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Price to Compare

Average Contract Rate

While the introduction of competition is the key
driver behind these falling prices, the decline
in PTC within the AEP territory is not wholly
attributable to competitive generation markets.
Over the same time period, transmission costs
shifted to the regulated portion of a customer’s bill
and dropped out of the PTC calculation. However,
this contribution to the PTC reduction was only a
fraction of the PTC savings. In 2015, for instance,
AEP only charged 0.7 cents per kWh for its
regulated transmission charge.45 That year, AEP’s
Columbus Southern secondary rate class PTC
dropped 2.77 cents, meaning that 97% of the drop
in PTC could be attributed to the introduction of
competition to the price-setting process.
5. Avoided Cost and Headroom
As auction prices and competition reduced
the PTC, CRES providers are faced with an
increasingly challenging environment in which to

Utility

2016

2017

2018

AEP

6%

11%

11%

Duke

14%

10%

7%

3%

1%

-1%

FirstEnergy

DPL

13%

10%

16%

Average

9%

8%

8%

that avoided costs will be reduced as an equilibrium
price is reached. That is how competitive markets
work. The broader goal of competition is to drive
efficiency and put downward pressure on prices.
Lower avoided costs are indicative of success
in achieving this goal. However, the headroom
between the PTC and contract prices must remain
high enough to encourage aggregators, brokers,
and CRES providers to compete and survive in
the market. It is for this reason that subsidies for
generation, especially that generation bid into the
SSO auctions, pose a considerable threat to the
electricity markets in Ohio. If the CRES providers,
aggregators, and brokers leave the market, then
competitive pressure will ease and prices will rise
once again.

45

Based on Broker calculations.

46

 homas, et al. (2016). “Electricity Customer Choice in Ohio: How Competition Has Outperformed Traditional Monopoly Regulation.”
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VII. INTERSTATE COMPARISON:
REGULATED VS. DEREGULATED STATES

EIA utility data are limited in their ability to account
for the full effect of deregulation, insofar as the
data fail to include savings from private contracts
due to shopping. Even so, the EIA data provide
relevant information for studying the savings from
introducing competition into the SSO auctions. As
shown in our 2016 study, savings from standard
service auctions provide the biggest overall savings
to ratepayers, including for those who do not shop.

on electricity price. Ohio is geographically
surrounded by states with similar economies,
energy systems, and varied regulatory statuses.
Accordingly, we focused our analysis on Ohio’s
regulated and deregulated neighbors. We analyzed
mean electricity prices in Indiana, Michigan,
and Wisconsin (regulated states) and compared
them to prices in Ohio, Illinois, and Pennsylvania
(deregulated states).

In this updated report, the Study Team utilized
two statistical tests to estimate the impact of
deregulation on the PTC in Ohio. These analyses
are similar to those conducted by the Study Team
in 2016, updated with data through 2017 (the last
year of available EIA data at the time of the tests
were run).

We began our analysis of changes in the price
of electricity among this set of Midwestern
states in 2003. This is the year that O’Connor
and O’Connell-Diaz (2015) demonstrated that
true competitive markets began to develop in
the Midwest.47

Combating relatively high electricity prices
has been the primary motivation behind state
deregulation. It stands to reason that states with
historically higher mean prices are more likely to
be among the states that deregulated generating
markets in an attempt to bring the relative cost
of electricity down. We know that this was the
motivation for deregulation in Ohio.
A. SIX MIDWESTERN STATES
By comparing states that are similar to each other,
we can better distinguish the effect of deregulation

47

Table 5 shows the results of a two-way Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) test. This analysis provides two
key conclusions. First, after deregulation began
to take hold in 2003, the mean price of electricity
in the deregulated states decreased from 11.9
cents/kWh to 10.2 cents/kWh. Second, during
that same time period, the mean price of electricity
in the regulated states increased from 9.9 cents/
kWh to 10.1 cents/kWh. While the mean price in
deregulated states remains slightly higher reflecting
its higher starting point, the price trend is indicative
of the downward pressure competition has put on
electricity prices.

 ’Connor, P. & O’Connell-Diaz, E. (2015). Evolution of the Revolution: The sustained success of retail electricity competition.
O
COMPETE. Retrieved from: https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/publications/evolution-revolution-sustained-success-retail-electricitycompetition. Note that Ohio, which deregulated in 2001, did not really see markets develop until after SB 221 was passed in 2008.
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Before (1990-2002)
After (2003-2017)

Regulated States
IN, MI, WI Mean
(Standard Error)

Deregulated States
OH, IL, PA Mean
(Standard Error)

0.0994

0.1193

(0.0023)

(0.0020)

0.1008

0.1022

(0.0017)

(0.0011)

***Statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level.
Real 2018 dollars

Figure 12 shows the mean electricity price of
each of the two groups of Midwestern states in
our analysis from 1990 to 2017. The price spread
between the deregulated and regulated states was
fairly consistent throughout the 1990s. However,
once competition developed in the Midwest in
2003, the relationship between the two groups
began to change. As the benefits of deregulation
took effect, the prices begin to converge from
2002 to 2003. And, between 2010 and 2011 the
average price in the deregulated states fell below
the average price in the regulated group of states.
The two distinct price trends provides insight how
the power of deregulation and competition has
performed compared to regulation in the Midwest.

FIGURE 12: Mean Electricity Prices in All
Sectors in Six Midwestern States, 1990-2017
Marginal Means of Electricity Prices

TABLE 5: Effects of Deregulation on Midwest
Electricity Prices in All Sectors Combined
Average Mean Cost of Electricity per Kilowatt
Hour, 1990-2017

$0.13
$0.12
$0.11
$0.10
$0.09
1990

1995

2000

IL, OH, PA

2005

2010

2015

IN, MI, WI

B. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS
The difference-in-difference model statistically
isolates the impact of deregulation between the
two sets of Midwestern states by removing path
dependencies. Historical cost structures and
regulatory regimes tend to put future prices and
operating costs on a pre-determined path relative
to other states. Hence, the electricity price in any
year is closely tied to the previous year’s price. The
difference-in-difference model estimates the effects
of deregulation, isolating it from previous.
A key aspect of a difference-in-difference model is
determining the inflection point, which is when the
event that is hypothesized to have disrupted the
previous path occurred. In our case, it is the year in
which competition in electricity generating markets
began in Ohio. While Senate Bill 3 restructured
Ohio’s generation markets in 1999, the bill failed to
enable the development of true competition due to
price freezes and a “market development” period.
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Ohio’s complicated and winding journey towards
true competitive markets makes it difficult to
pinpoint when the effects of competition finally took
hold in the state. Accordingly, we conducted two
analyses with distinctly different inflection points.
In one test, we used 2003, the year O’Connor
and O’Connell-Diaz stated that deregulation took
hold generally in the Midwest.48 In the other, we
used 2009, the year after SB 221 restructuring

was enacted, and the first year that Ohio’s utilities
began to conduct competitive SSO auctions.
This difference-in-difference statistical modeling
approach is designed to capture the difference
between electricity prices in both regulated and
deregulated states (the first difference) before and
after competition began (the second difference),
and then compare these differences. Table 6
displays the results from the analysis.49

TABLE 6: Average Price per kWh under Two Assumptions about When Deregulation Began
2003

2009

Prices before
Deregulation

Prices after
Deregulation

Difference

Prices before
Deregulation

Prices after
Deregulation

Difference

Deregulated States

0.1193

.1022

-0.0171

.1146

.1007

-0.0139

Regulated States

0.0994

0.1008

0.0014

.09830

.1040

Difference in
Differences

-0.0185

0.0057
-0.0196

***The interaction term was significant at the p < 0.001 level in the case of either 2003 or 2009 being the year that deregulation took
effect. All prices adjusted for inflation.

Using the 2003 inflection point, as proposed by O’Connor and O’Connell-Diaz, the independent effect
of deregulation is determined to be a savings 1.85 cents per kWh, on average, across all rate classes
in the three deregulated states. Using 2009 as the year competition began, the independent effect of
deregulation saved 1.96 cents per kWh, on average, across all rate classes in the three deregulated states.
These results are similar to those found in our 2016 study, which looked at EIA data through 2015 and found
that the difference after 2009 was around 1.76 cents/kWh between regulated and unregulated markets. The
small increase since 2015 can be attributed to competition continuing to lower electricity prices.50

48

Id.

49

The more formal methods of propensity score matching and the Jenks natural breaks algorithm for dividing data into homogenous
classes were also used to select groupings of regulated and deregulated states most like Ohio with regard to generation capacity
per capita, mix of resources for electricity generation, and unit fuel costs. Accordingly, a difference-in-difference analysis performed
on data for these states (MI, NV, VA, VT, WI, and NC on the regulated side and OH, IL, ME, and PA on the deregulated side)
determined savings in the deregulated states due to competition of 1.33 cents/kWh, using 2003 as the inflection point, and 1.26
cents/kWh using 2009 as the year competition began. Thus, the savings identified in our difference-in-difference model of Ohio and
its neighboring states is not an artifact of the selection of neighboring regulated and deregulated states.

50

 n additional small increase in the total difference comes from using a different measure of inflation in the latest study. The first study
A
assumed a constant 2% rate of inflation, which is reasonable given that this is the rate targeted by the Federal Reserve. However,
for the latest study we instead used the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI for Electricity for All Urban Consumers which better controls
for the between-year variability in the price level for electricity. This measure of the change in the price level for electricity in particular
from one year to the next averaged approximately 2.2% during the study period. See https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/
january/fed-inflation-target-2-percent. See also https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CUSR0000SEHF01
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VIII. ESTIMATED SAVINGS
DRIVEN BY DEREGULATION

A. SAVINGS CREATED THROUGH
DEREGULATION, FROM 2011 TO 2015
Our 2016 report analyzed savings from 2011
to 2015 by separately calculating (1) savings
resulting from the competitive market’s downward
pressure on utilities’ Standard Service Offers,
and (2) shopper’s avoided costs (i.e. savings
below the Price to Compare or PTC). The latter
is only realized by consumers that actively shop
for electricity, while the former is realized by all
customers of Ohio’s IOUs, whether they shop or
not. The following tables summarize the Team’s
findings from the initial report published in 2016.
Table 7 describes savings from shopping for
both mercantile consumers (using over 700,000
kWh/year – i.e. industrial and large commercial
customers) and non-mercantile consumers
(residential and small commercial customers using
less than 700,000 kWh/year). Table 8 summarizes
savings consumers realized due to falling SSO
prices, and Table 9 outlines total savings from
2011 to 2015. The methodology used to calculate
these savings are provided in Section VII of the
initial report.51 All industrial consumers, due to
their high usage, are assumed to be mercantile,
while all residential consumers are assumed to
be non-mercantile.

TABLE 7: Total Shopping Savings from
Mercantile and Non-Mercantile Markets
from 2011 to 2015 (millions of dollars)
Year

Mercantile

Non-Mercantile

Total

2011

$391.60

$105.1

$496.70

2012

$324.69

$118.6

$443.29

2013

$600.81

$143.3

$744.11

2014

$664.21

$160.0

$824.21

2015

$487.19

$157.8

$645.19

$2,468.50

$684.80

$3,153.30

Total

TABLE 8: Savings from Competitive SSO,
Not Including Shopping from 2011 to 2015
(millions of dollars)
Year

SSO

2011

$2,395.00

2012

$2,366.00

2013

$2,342.00

2014

$2,380.00

2015

$2,339.00

Total

TABLE 9: Total Savings from Deregulation
from 2011 to 2015 (millions of dollars)
Year

SSO

2011

$2,891.70

2012

$2,809.29

2013

$3,086.11

2014

$3,204.21

2015

$2,984.19

Total
51

$11,822.00

$14,975.30
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B. SAVINGS CREATED THROUGH
DEREGULATION, 2016-2018
In our 2016 study, we projected likely consumer
savings for the next five years based on our
findings. The principal purpose of this study is to
determine if, in fact, those projected savings were
realized and to determine if market conditions have
changed in ways that could change the future path
of savings.
Accordingly, the Study Team updated the savings
from deregulation for both shoppers and nonshoppers in Ohio to include the three years that
passed since the 2016 study was completed. The
savings realized from 2016 to 2018 are broken
down into costs avoided by active shoppers
and savings delivered to all consumers through
decreasing SSOs. The Study team utilized updated
data and methods to determine consumer savings
from 2016 to 2018.
1. Avoided Costs from Shopping
The total cost Ohio consumers avoided through
shopping was estimated by multiplying the
average avoided cost in both mercantile and
non-mercantile rate classes by the amount of
electricity consumed by shoppers in each class.
All industrial consumers, due to their high usage,
are assumed to be mercantile customers, while all
residential consumers are assumed to be nonmercantile. Commercial customers, due to their
wide range of usage, can fall into either category.
Using aggregated and anonymized broker data, the
team approximated the percentage of commercial
loads that fell into the mercantile category. Table 10
provides those percentages by utility service area.
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TABLE 10: Percentage of Commercial
Load That Was Mercantile from May 2015
to June 2016
Utility

% Mercantile

AEP Ohio Power

44%

AEP Columbus Southern

54%

Dayton Power & Light

41%

Duke Energy Ohio

61%

FirstEnergy Ohio Edison

32%

FirstEnergy Toledo Edison

33%

FirstEnergy Illuminating Co.

50%

To estimate the total avoided costs from shopping,
the percentages in Table 10 were assumed to be
the mercantile percentage of Ohio’s commercial
load from 2016 to 2018.
Average avoided cost data for industrial and large
commercial mercantile customers was calculated
using broker-derived data, based on actual
aggregate contracts. The analysis of mercantile
customers’ savings through shopping from 2016
to 2018 is presented in Tables 11 and 12, both by
utility and by year.
TABLE 11: Total Savings through
Shopping, by Utility, for Mercantile
Electricity Customers from 2016 to 2018
(millions of dollars)
Utility

Savings

AEP

$264.44

Duke Energy Ohio

$153.79

Dayton Power & Light
FirstEnergy
Total

$45.21
$607.99
$1,071.44

TABLE 12: Total Savings through Shopping,
by Year, for Mercantile Electricity Customers
from 2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)

TABLE 13: Total Savings through
Shopping, by Utility, for Non-Mercantile
Electricity Customers from 2016 to 2017
(millions of dollars)

Year

Savings

2016

$408.30

Utility

2017

$309.69

AEP

$56.12

2018

$353.45

Duke Energy Ohio

$33.54

Total

$1,071.44

Dayton Power & Light

$25.06

FirstEnergy

$111.65

In 2016, the Study Team calculated non-mercantile
savings by applying the flat savings rate guaranteed
by the Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council
(NOPEC): 4% off the PTC for commercial users
and 6% off the PTC for residential users. NOPEC
continued to provide these same savings rates
through 2016. In 2017, NOPEC changed its savings
rates slightly, providing rates that were 4% off the
PTC for both commercial and residential users.
By 2018, however, the PTC was such that CRES
providers were no longer offering rates tied to
the PTC. (This shows the power of a functioning
competitive market. The PTC is now so close
to the market equilibrium price that margins for
aggregators and brokers are being squeezed. This
is exactly how markets are expected to work—for
the financial benefit of consumers.) Aggregators
and brokers began to use the mercantile model
of basing their rates upon contracts from CRES
providers. As a result, the Study Team was unable
to obtain a data-base for 2018 non-mercantile
contracts in time for this Study. Accordingly, for
purposes of this Study, we assumed the savings
to be zero for that year.
However, the team was able to analyze nonmercantile shopping savings for both 2016 and
2017, assuming that the flat savings rates tied to
the PTC provided by NOPEC were representative
of the rates available in the marketplace. Tables
13 and 14 summarize the savings non-mercantile
users realized through shopping.

Savings

Total

$226.37

TABLE 14: Total Savings through
Shopping, by Year, for Non-Mercantile
Electricity Customers from 2016 to 2017
(millions of dollars)
Year

Savings

2016

$132.47

2017

$93.90

Total

$226.37

Adding up the savings through shopping from both
mercantile and non-mercantile consumers, we
find that shoppers saved $1.29 billion from 2016 to
2018. Table 15 outlines the total shopping savings
during this time period.
TABLE 15: Total Shopping Savings from
Mercantile and Non-Mercantile Electricity
Users from 2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
Year

Mercantile

Non-Mercantile

Total

2016

$408.30

$132.47

$540.77

2017

$309.69

$93.90

$403.59

2018
Total

$353.45

–

$353.45

$1,071.44

$226.37

$1,297.81

These savings are realized only by those
consumers who choose to shop for their electric
service providers, rather than accept the default
PTC rate.
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While the percentage of shopping consumers is
increasing, only 57% of all customers purchased
electricity from CRES providers in 2018.52 On the
other hand, the savings achieved from competitive
auctions driving down SSOs are realized by all
electricity consumers of Ohio, whether they shop
or not. This excludes those consumers who are
outside the PUCO jurisdiction (i.e. customers of
municipal and rural cooperative utilities). These
consumers comprise a very small fraction of Ohio’s
electricity users.

to build their standard service offers (SSOs). After
2009, the estimated cost difference between
electricity prices reported by utilities to the Energy
Information Agency (EIA) in the six regulated and
deregulated Midwest states was an average of
1.96 cents for each kWh consumed. This savings
estimate was then multiplied by the total kilowatt
hours consumed in Ohio in 2016 and 2017. We
used an estimate of 2018 electricity consumption
as the basis of that year’s calculation. These
savings estimates are in Table 16.

2. Savings from Standard Service Offers

Table 16: Savings from Deregulated SSOs
in Ohio, Not Including Shopping from
2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)

Competitive generation markets have delivered
savings to all Ohio consumers. The use of a
competitive auctions in Ohio to determine the
standard service offer, the main component of the
Price to Compare, has significantly driven down the
cost of electric power purchases since 2011.
To estimate the value delivered to consumers by
the decreasing PTC, we used the savings rate
from the difference-in-difference model in Section
VI. We determined that 2009 was the appropriate
inflection point for Ohio, as it is the first year utilities
began to use, at least in part, competitive auctions

52

Year

SSO

2016

$2,553.9

2017

$2,502.1

2018

$2,612.6 (estimated)

Total

$7,668.6

We estimate that all Ohio consumers have saved
over $7.6 billion from 2016 to 2018 as a result of
deregulated generation markets driving down
the PTC.

PUCO. (2019). Retail Market Activity: Switching Rate Percentage (Customer Count). https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiMjU1Z
WRkNGUtYmJmZS00YTEyLTk5NWYtMGE1NmJmZjYxMzVjIiwidCI6IjUwZjhmY2M0LTk0ZDgtNGYwNy04NGViLTM2ZWQ1N2M3Yzhh
MiJ9
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IX. TOTAL SAVINGS FROM
DEREGULATION, FROM 2011 TO 2018

Tables 17 and 18 provide summaries of the savings
generated from deregulation from 2011 to 2015 and
from 2016 to 2018, respectively. Table 19 highlights
the total savings realized by Ohio consumers
since 2011.
We have found that Ohio’s electricity users saved
$4.45 billion by shopping for their power and
$19.49 billion by accessing competitive SSOs
delivered by deregulated electricity generation.
From 2011 to 2018, Ohio consumers saved
$23.94 billion as a result of deregulation,
averaging just under $3 billion a year.
In 2016 we projected savings of around
$2.8 billion per year for the next five years, based
upon existing market trends. In fact, savings have
been closer to $3 billion a year for 2016, 2017 and
2018. We expect to see these trends continue, so
long as there are no major impairments to the retail
markets, such as large-scale cross subsidization
by regulated Electric Distribution Utilities, price
supports of uneconomic generation plants, or the
pre-monopolization of alternative energy generating
sources by the IOU.

TABLE 17: Total Savings Due to Deregulated
Electricity Generation Markets in Ohio from
2011 to 2015 (millions of dollars)
Year

Shopping

SSO

Total

2011

$496.70

$2,395.00

$2,891.70

2012

$443.29

$2,366.00

$2,809.29

2013

$744.11

$2,342.00

$3,086.11

2014

$824.21

$2,380.00

$3,204.21

2015

$645.19

$2,339.00

$2,984.19

$3,153.30

$11,822.00

$14,975.30

Total

TABLE 18: Total Savings Due to Deregulated
Electricity Generation Markets in Ohio from
2016 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
Year

Shopping

SSO

Total

2016

$540.77

$2,553.9

$3,094.67

2017

$403.59

$2,502.1

$2,905.69

2018
Total

$353.45

$2,612.6

$2,966.05

$1,297.81

$7,668.6

$8,966.41

TABLE 19: Total Savings from Deregulated
Electricity Generation Markets in Ohio from
2011 to 2018 (millions of dollars)
Shopping

SSO

Total

$4,451.11

$19,490.60

$23,941.71
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X. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this report was to analyze the
ongoing impact of Ohio’s decision to deregulate
retail electricity markets. Ohio’s deregulation of
electricity generation has saved Ohio consumers
about $24 billion over the past 8 years. Deregulation,
once championed by investor-owned utilities, now
faces challenges from these same stakeholders,
who have been regularly petitioning both the PUCO
and the Ohio General Assembly for subsidies to
bailout their loss-making, aging, uncompetitive
generation fleets. These efforts, if successful, will
erode the significant benefits and financial savings
that Ohio’s consumers have realized as a result of
deregulated electricity generation markets.
Competitive markets drive innovation and
investment into new, efficient power plants,
and subject to the discipline of the market. In
turn, this reduces generation costs and total
electricity prices. This impact can be seen in
our comparison of regulated and deregulated
Midwestern states. Since competitive markets
have taken hold, electricity prices in deregulated
states have decreased, while electricity costs
in the regulated states have increased. Without
competition, customers in regulated states were
locked into old, inefficient, and costly generation
plants. Competitive markets react more readily to
economic signals, replacing old facilities with more
efficient and cost-effective generation. Additionally,
competitive markets shift the risk of these
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investments to investors. In a regulated market,
consumers are saddled with the risk of any utility
rate base investment. This is not to say that social
and environmental costs of generation choices can
never be factored into the Price to Compare or to
energy markets in general. Rather, such costs must
be reflected in these markets in a manner that does
not leak into regulated markets, or otherwise impair
free markets.
Ohio’s regulatory structure can be improved
by reducing utility incentives to seek crosssubsidization for their deregulated legacy generation
businesses. The best way to accomplish this would
be to require that utilities fully divest their generation
assets, as Duke has done, and that the ratemaking
process include more rigorous oversight over nonbypassable charges to ensure that generation costs
or forgone profits do not leak into the regulated side
of the business.
Competitive markets have proven to be a
powerful tool to deliver value to Ohio’s ratepayers.
Competitive rates are attractive to businesses
looking to locate in Ohio. Efforts to undermine
the efficiency of these markets, like subsidies for
uneconomic generating facilities, are a threat to
Ohio’s economic development and wellbeing. Any
attempt to derail competitive generation markets
would cause significant harm to all of Ohio’s
electric consumers and Ohio’s economy.

APPENDIX 1.
Average Avoided Costs for Secondary Mercantile Customers 2011-2018
Utility

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

AEP

20%

24%

29%

30%

18%

6%

11%

11%

Duke Energy of Ohio

34%

7%

14%

17%

13%

14%

10%

7%

Dayton Power & Light

19%

15%

16%

20%

19%

3%

1%

-1%

FirstEnergy

16%

15%

13%

24%

21%

13%

10%

16%

22%

15%

18%

23%

18%

9%

8%

8%

Average
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The Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council (NOPEC) is
a non-profit natural gas and electric energy aggregation
representing more than 900,000 residential and small
business customers in over 230 communities in 17 Ohio
counties. NOPEC was founded in 2000. NOPEC operates
as a governmental opt-out aggregation. We use bulk-buying
techniques to get the most reliable and competitively priced
energy we can and then supply that power in the form of
electricity and natural gas to our customers. We estimate
that since we were founded, we have saved our customers
in Northeast Ohio over a quarter billion dollars in cumulative
electric savings. We are also increasingly involved in
encouraging and implementing energy conservation that
saves our customers additional money.
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